Using campaign contributions to legislators as an indicator of member influence, we explore the impact of term limits on the distribution of power within state legislatures. Specifically, we perform a cross-state comparison of the relative influence of party caucus leaders, committee chairs, and rank-and-file legislators before and after term limits. The results indicate that term limits diffuse power in state legislatures, both by decreasing average contributions to incumbents and by reducing the power of party caucus leaders relative to other members. The change in contribution levels across legislators in different chambers implies a shift in power to the upper chamber in states with term limits. Thus, the impact of term limits may be attenuated in a bicameral system.
extrapolations using pre-term-limit electoral data (Moncrief et al. 1 992; Opheim 1994) . These studies, along with later studies as term limits have taken effect, have focused on the effect of term limits on the composition of the legislature and on the behavior of officeholders (Bernstein and Chadha 2003; Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000) . Several studies reviewing institutional effects showed that term limits redistribute power away from the legislature and toward external institutional actors, such as interest groups, state executives, and the bureaucracy Powell 1998, 2000; Moncrief et al. 2001; Peery and Little 2003) . Very little research has considered the effects of term limits on the financing of incumbent legislators, or how power changes within legislatures (Drage et al. 2003) . In this study, which observes the impact of term limits across states, we are primarily interested in shifts in contributions before and after term limits and how these shifts reflect changes in power from one subset of legislators to another.
Term limits were advocated primarily as a means of abolishing legislative careerism. Ironically, many of the states that passed term limits, particularly in the West, already had citizen legislatures. We expect the effect of term limits in these states to be fairly small. In professional legislatures,2 however, term limits can have a significant impact on legislative careers. In California, for example, where term limits for both houses of the legislature took effect in 1998, fully 75% of the Assembly and 60% of the Senate exceeded the respective limits imposed by the term-limits initiative, Proposition 140, at the time that it was passed (Capell 1996) . It is clear that term limits increase legislative turnover, particularly in states with lifetime rather than consecutive term limits. Some evidence also suggests that term limits increase racial, ethnic, and occupational diversity in the legislature (Caress 2001 ; Carroll and Jenkins 2001) , although more-recent analysis casts doubt on this dynamic (Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004) . It is less clear how term limits have altered the internal dynamics of legislatures. To date, only a few studies have attempted to measure these changes (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000) .
Our first goal in this article is to explore how term limits affect political contributions to state legislators, which is our measure of political power. Reviewing campaign contributions provides insights about donor behavior in the wake of term limits, specifically, how interest groups distribute money in the face of uncertainty about the future power of individual representatives.
Second, we will consider if the power dynamics across legislative chambers have changed in term-limited states. Are party caucus leaders
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as powerful in a legislature with retain their traditional power? Thes or not legislatures have the instit of organizational complexity and perform policy work effectively ment (Polsby 1968 Cassie and Thompson 1998) or to the majority party (Thompson, Cassie, and Jewell 1994) . Studies of Congress also demonstrate important differences in interest group strategies across chambers due to dissimilar power structures, such as relative influence of committees (Grier and Munger 1993) and majority control of the chamber (Cox and Magar 1999) .
Because the flow of political contributions reflects perceptions of power, we expect varying levels of incumbent fund-raising to indicate the relative power of members in a legislature. In short, contributions should reflect the influence of legislators and their ability to control policy. In a highly institutionalized legislature, with clearly differentiated member roles and structured policy committees, we expect to find systematic differences among legislators. Specifically, party caucus leaders should receive the most contributions, followed by committee chairs, and, lastly, rank-and-file members. In less institutionalized legislatures, or citizen legislatures, these differences should be present but less pronounced.
We theorize that term limits have a leveling effect on legislatures, largely because they remove sources of leadership power such as seniority and the capacity to punish or reward rank-and-file members over the long term (because lame-duck status is rarely more than one or two sessions away). The weakening of caucus leaders and committee chairs should be reflected in the pattern of campaign contributions.
Instead of working mainly through a caucus leader or committee chair, interest groups should be pursuing what Capell (1996) calls a "retail" strategy, providing a wider distribution of resources to many members rather than engaging in a "wholesale" strategy that channels funds to leaders who then deliver votes. Interest groups may be forced to spend more resources to reach more members than in the past, as a way of forging the winning policy coalition formerly accomplished by legislative leaders, but groups may also choose to distribute the same amount of money more widely. If interest groups follow this strategy, then all members should receive less in campaign contributions. In addition, party leaders should lose much of their relative advantage in fund-raising.
The combination of lame-duck status and inexperience should also make it difficult for committee chairs to manage their committees effectively, thus making the chairs less attractive to donors. Rank-andfile members may be less willing to bargain with chairs who will depart the next session or with newly minted chairs who lack significant policy expertise and organizational memory. Our premise is that donors seek legislators with power, so we expect contributions patterns to "flatten" in a term-limited legislature, because power is more diffuse than in a non-term-limited legislature. Each wave of new members into the legislature destabilizes previous power arrangements, making donors unsure about who will have the most power in future legislative sessions. Rather than take guesses about who will have disproportionate influence in the policy process and then concentrate contributions among an exclusive pool of legislators, donors will pursue a "retail" strategy that attempts to build a relationship with each legislator.
Hypothesis 2: Contributions to legislators in states with term limits in effect will be more decentralized, with party caucus leaders and committee chairs receiving a level of contributions comparable to that received by rank-and-file members.
Term limits reduce the capacity of legislative leaders to accumulate power over time by developing policy expertise, instituting powerenhancing rules, and forging close personal ties with colleagues and other power brokers (such as the governor's office, bureaucrats, and lobbyists). Therefore, the gap in power between the legislative leadership and the rank and file will be reduced in a term-limited legislature.
Hypothesis 3: The effect of term limits will be attenuated in the upper chamber.
Because members of the upper chamber have typically already served in the lower chamber, they should have greater policy experience and closer personal ties to other power brokers than those members in the lower house. They will also have more experience working as legislators and moving (or stopping) legislation. As a result, power relationships in the upper house will not change as dramatically as they will in the lower house. The pattern of donations to members of the upper house should not be as different between term-limited and non-term-limited states as it will be in the lower house.
Data and Methods
We selected eight states for our analysis (Arizona, California, Florida, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Washington, and Wisconsin),4 four with term limits and four without term limits. We were primarily interested in changes in contributions to incumbents, so our first priority was to choose states that had had term limits in effect for at least one full legislative session. We also wanted evidence from states representing different regions and different levels of legislative professionalism. But not all states make contributions data publicly available to researchers. Ultimately, we were able to collect data for California and Maine, where term limits took full effect in 1998, and for Arizon and Florida, where term limits took full effect in 2000. Our comparison states without term limits (but with data available) were Iowa, Massachusetts, Washington, and Wisconsin. To determine if states that passed term limits were fundamentally different from states that did not, we included two states that had passe before the limits took effect (Ma For all of the states in our analys data for two election cycles apiece chose one election cycle before te election cycle after term limits h term limits, we chose years that w for our analysis, not all states pas did they take effect at a single poin for term-limited California for t limits were adopted in 1990) and term-limited Iowa for 1988 and 1 might be a bias toward seeing an ef too early before term limits took ef data in an effort to compensate f least likely to see a term-limits r before and just after term limits remainder of our data cover the and after term limits and a few yea We were most interested in how of power in the legislature, as me butions. As a result, our unit of a our dependent variable was camp tions came from both organizatio not separate out these contributi Research on contributions made b the vast majority of these are bund groups (Marshall 1997 (Marshall , 1999 . We which we could separate individua majority were made by organization overall contributions to legislators and, as a result, serve as a valid indi
We collected data on campaign running for office in each state for tacting the campaign finance adm also contacted several state legislat the most powerful legislative com the names of members who held leadership positions on these committees, as well as the names of members who were party caucus leaders. Our data include over 110 party leaders and 175 committee chairs. Further details regarding data collection appear in the Appendix.
Because our analysis spanned many years of data, from 1985 to 2002, we translated all contributions data into 2002 real dollars so that contributions were comparable across years. We used Consumer Price Index (CPI) multipliers for all urban consumers to eliminate inflation effects (CPI-U is the baseline CPI provided by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics). In addition, because the legislatures of the states in our analysis have varying levels of professionalism (Squire 1992) , we expected the legislators from different states to have different baseline contribution levels, with incumbents from states with professional legislatures having higher overall contributions. Because legislative professionalism is correlated with state population, we divided contributions by the size of the population in each legislator's district. Therefore, our figures on baseline contributions to incumbent legislators are provided in 2002 real dollars per one thousand district residents.
We suspected that other factors might also affect contribution levels across state legislatures. We created variables indicating whether or not the state was simultaneously electing a governor, in addition to state legislators, and if it was a presidential election year. A simultaneous statewide or national election could increase legislative contributions by drawing in more contributors, or decrease them by redirecting contributions from legislators to the executive races. We were agnostic about the direction of the potential effect. In addition, we noted if the state was running the first election after a redistricting, which we thought might increase overall contribution levels because of the probability that some sitting incumbents would be forced to compete for the same seat when district lines were redrawn. We collected data for these variables from information provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures (2003) . We also included a dummy variable indicating whether or not a state had public financing for legislators in effect, which we expected to decrease contributions. Finally, we created dummy variables for each state to control for the range of differences across states that were not directly measurable. After some consideration, we chose not to include measures of candidate quality, which are difficult to obtain for state legislators. All of the legislators in our analysis were incumbents running for reelection. By definition, all of them had state legislative experience, and, as a result, we expected their quality scores to be fairly comparable and to provide little leverage in determining contribution levels.
Establishing the determinants o election cycles containing the sam somewhat complex. We describe ou section.
Results
Our results support all three of our proposed hypotheses. It appears that states with term limits in effect have lower average contribution levels, that contributions are more evenly balanced between party caucus leaders and rank-and-file members after term limits take effect, and that these effects are less apparent in the upper chamber in states with term limits than in the lower chamber.
When we compare states with and without term limits, before and after term limits took effect, we see that the average level of contributions (per one thousand residents in each incumbent's district) drops in states with term limits. States with and without term limits had average contribution levels of $983 and $763, respectively, (in real 2002 dollars) in each state's first election cycle. In the states with term limits, average contributions dropped to $690 in the second election cycle, but the average contribution in non-term-limited states increased to $891 . This effect was consistent for both upper and lower houses of the legislatures and appears to support the claim that term limits act as a form of campaign finance reform. But this finding may mask underlying patterns of interest group contributions. A detailed study of tobacco industry contributions before and after term limits, for example, showed that tobacco companies gave smaller contributions to a larger number of legislators, spending the same amount before and after term limits but gaining more access by contributing to more legislators (Apollonio, Glantz, and Bero 2004) . This result does imply, however, that organizations may be pursuing a retail strategy in the wake of term limits. The first hypothesis, that legislators in term-limited states receive lower average contributions, appears to be correct.
In the states that passed term limits, party caucus leaders clearly controlled most of the political contributions before term limits took effect (Figure 1 ). These leaders received average contributions of $2,646 (again, in real 2002 dollars per one thousand district residents), committee chairs received $1,138, and rank-and-file members received $839. The average contributions to all legislators dropped after the institution of term limits, but the effect was most extreme for party caucus leaders, whose average contributions dropped by over half, to $ 1 , 1 96. Contributions to committee chairs also dropped by almost half, to $660, and average contributions to rank-and-file members dropped less dramatically, to $693. In the election cycle before term limits took effect, party caucus leaders received over three times the contributions of rank-and-file members. After term limits took effect, their contributions were less than twice as large.
Non-term-limited states do not show the same flattening of contributions in the same time period. If anything, party caucus leaders increased their relative share of contributions. The states that did not pass term limits in our sample began with a lower share of contributions going to party caucus leaders, probably because the term-limited states in our sample are slightly weighted toward professional legislatures, where term limits first took effect (California and Florida). In the first election cycle, party caucus leaders received average contributions of $1,420, committee chairs received $794, and rank-and-file members received $724. In the second election cycle, contributions to committee chairs and rank-and-fil $899 and $790, but contributions t over 50%, to $2,516.
We considered alternative expla in leadership contributions in term plausible. For example, caucus lead the experience to be effective fun fects rank-and-file members as w members should perform just as ba tant, interview evidence sugges becoming an essential criterion in lea members can no longer rely on pers policy expertise or legislative skill long careers (Drage et al. 2003) .
Another conceivable explanation tions is a possible increase in comp which could spur more contributio all, however, seats became less com We note also that average contribu all types of incumbents. If compe difference between leadership and m expect legislators to increase their av this period. Instead, contributio declined, although not as dramatic Finally, our results do not appea such as changes in campaign finan consider. For example, if a state h candidates from $1,000 to $500, th difficult to amass campaign funds the states in our sample, Californ during this time. When we ana California, the results did not chan The second hypothesis suggested t term limits would be more decentra states before the imposition of ter without term limits. Building on this point, we ran regressions on t bents in the states in our sample, already observed.
The regression to determine ass and legislative characteristics is s bents in states without term lim term limits) may appear repeatedly in multiple election cycles. To compensate for the correlated errors observed when the same individual appears multiple times in the data, we ran our regressions using robust standard errors with clustering; each individual that appeared multiple times made up a cluster.9 Errors are correlated within the cluster representing a single individual, but different individuals are assumed to be independent of each other.
Our first regression reviewed the correlates of average contributions (in 2002 real dollars for every one thousand residents of each district) for incumbents of the lower houses of each state ( Table 1) . As expected, party leaders in non-term-limited states and in pre-termlimited states received over $2,000 more in contributions than did rankand-file members.10 Contributions to committee chairs did not differ significantly from those made to rank-and-file members. For states with term limits in effect, neither party caucus leaders nor committee chairs received significantly more contributions than did rank-and-file members. We also ran a regression comparing term-limited states only, before and after the term-limits effect, and controlling for the competitiveness of seats. (We were only able to obtain competitiveness data for the termlimited states.) These results are robust across both specifications.11
Having term limits in effect, however, decreased the level of contributions to members of the lower house. When we control for other factors, we find that the imposition of term limits decreased the level of contributions by over $500 per incumbent. This effect is larger in practice, because contributions in the regression are given in per capita terms. For a California Assembly member, the real size of this effect is over $200,000 in 2002 dollars. Control variables found, as expected, that Democrats received significantly less in contributions than did Republicans and that members of the majority party received more in contributions than members of the minority party. In addition, incumbent legislators received greater contributions in gubernatorial election years than other legislators. A surprising finding was that public financing was correlated with increased contributions to incumbents running for office. Although our analysis includes only two states with public financing, this result suggests that incumbents, on average, received more funds through "clean elections" programs that provided public funds than through the private financing system. We had expected to find that states with public funding would see a reduction in average contributions, given that public funds provided to each legislator are capped by mandatory spending limits, whereas states with private financing allow unlimited spending.12 Source: Data compiled by the authors, as described in the text. Multiple states and election cycles are included. */?<. 05; **/?<. 01.
Overall, both the expectation th receive lower contributions than hypothesis that party caucus leade limits appear to be borne out in on this analysis, we performed the upper chambers in the sample st suggest that our third hypothesis the upper chamber, is also valid (
In the analysis of contributions chamber, we find that party lead and pre-term-limited legislatures did rank-and-file members. As in th lower house, committee chairs -e committees that we considered -we rank-and-file members. The subst leaders in the upper chamber, how in the lower chamber, with an inc compared to more than $2,000 in house, party leaders, committee c the post-term-limits regimes did no of contributions, a result suggesting even in the upper house. Unlike was no correlation between the institution of term limits and lower overall contribution levels. Whatever effect term limits have in decreasing contributions, it does not seem to hold in the upper chamber.
Overall, we find support for all three of our proposed hypotheses.
Term limits do appear to be associated with decreased contribution levels, at least in the lower house of states with term limits. In addition, term limits equalize the contribution levels of party caucus leaders, committee chairs, and rank-and-file members, a finding that implies power is decentralized in states with term limits. Finally, although the decentralization effect holds in the upper chamber of term-limited legislatures, term limits do not appear to decrease overall contribution levels there, which suggests that the effects of constraining legislative tenure are reduced, at least in the short term, in a bicameral system where legislators can move up as they gain experience.
Discussion
Term limits appear to alter the power structure of American legislatures, creating a leveling effect among members. This reform affects the lower house more than the upper house, because newcomers typically start their legislative careers in the lower house. The lower house seems to lose some of its institutional structure as traditional power brokers, such as party leaders, lose influence relative to rankand-file legislators. In the senate, the organization of power does not appear to change as much because the infusion of new legislators typically comes from the lower house, where members have gained experience and personal ties that support traditional norms of legislative policymaking. In this way, the senate becomes the repository of experienced legislators who are familiar with conducting legislative business through policy committees and the party leadership structure.14 One implication of our findings is that the relatively stable structure in the senate may make the upper chamber more effective at processing legislation than the lower chamber, even if party caucus leaders are less powerful than they were before the imposition of term limits.
In an effort to maximize the impact of their resources, donors appear to have adapted to term limits in two ways. First, they have shifted resources to the more-experienced chamber, where the environment is more predictable and legislation is likely to be processed more efficiently. Second, they seem to pursue a retail strategy, especially in the lower house, where party caucus leaders have been weakened. Instead of concentrating money in the hands of leadership and pursuing policy goals wholesale, donors have broadened their strategy to reach other members.
The changes in career trajectories introduced by term limits could make the bicameral system even more relevant in policymaking than it has been in the past. The inducement for lower-house members to migrate to the upper chamber when they complete their stint in the lower chamber attenuates the full impact of term limits, at least in the short term. For each state and legislative session used in our analysis, we asked the legislative offices to identify the most powerful committees (the "juice" committees) in the legislature. For each committee we identified, we listed the chair and the ranking minority member as being committee chairs.
Arizona House committees, 1995 House committees, -1996 House committees, , 2001 5. In our initial analysis, we included a variable for all states that had passed term limits, but it was not significant, and thus the variable is not present in our final regressions.
6. In California, for example, more than 80% of contributions to incumbents came from organizations rather than individuals. In Iowa, which does not have a professional legislature like California and where we might expect a greater share of individual contributions, nearly two-thirds of the contributions received also came from organizations rather than individuals.
7. The average percent of competitive seats in the first election cycle was 26%, but only 22% of seats were competitive in the second election cycle. Only California increased its share of competitive seats from the first election cycle (10%) to the second election cycle (15%), but our results were consistent across all subsets of the termlimited states. To date, there have been few studies that demonstrate term limits increase
competition. An early study of the California legislature suggested that term limits increase competition significantly (Daniel and Lott 1997) , but a more recent comparative study of Michigan and Ohio indicates that term limits have not created significant increases in political competition (Allebaugh and Pinney 2003) . 8. We were especially concerned about California because the Assembly Speaker in 1986 was renowned as a prodigious fund-raiser.
9. Zorn (2001) demonstrated that this generalized model is superior to using a series of dummy variables. Unfortunately, it cannot be applied simultaneously to both repeated individuals and repeated state-level observations. As a result, we used the clustering method to compensate for correlated errors across individuals and dummy variables to compensate for correlated errors across states.
10. Our initial regression reviewed only states with and without term limits in the second election cycle. The results were nearly identical to the regression using all cases, so we describe the combined case for ease in interpretation and to maximize sample size. We also ran separate regressions, dropping an individual state each time, to see if any particular state was driving our results. Again, the results were nearly identical.
11. The competitive-seat measure was significant at the .05 level for the term- 12. This finding is not germane to our study. We can only speculate that many réélections and therefore would not typical chose to accept a relatively large lump su 13. As mentioned, we also ran a regres states before and after the imposition of competitiveness). The results were mostl results reported in the text is that term li butions in the senate. This result within ter distinct from the bicameral effect we dis the lower house, our results were nearly competitiveness was not significant nor d 14. We should note, however, that it is legislatures to have a weaker committee chamber has fewer members than the lowe with a less-developed organizational stru 1 5. Cain (1996) notes that a great deal of learning curve of new legislators and wh difficult to master relatively quickly.
